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Ghent, Belgium
In this conceptual analysis we discuss the sociological influences on Lacan’s
conceptualization of the relation between the subject and the other. In his writings
predating World War II Lacan defines this relation in terms of identification. However, from
1953 onward he defines it in terms of the subject of speech and the Symbolic Other. It is a
popular notion to characterize this change in terms of a radical breach, influenced by the
reading of Lévi-Strauss. However, through a close reading of both Lacan’s early writings
and their Durkheimian influences we will demonstrate that what has changed, is Lacan’s
conceptualization of the relation between the individual and the collective. This change
was gradual rather than sudden. Moreover, it can be situated within the theoretical
evolution of the contiguous fields of sociology, anthropology and psychoanalysis. Thus
we reject the idea of a breach within his own thought and with what came before
him. We will establish our point through a summary of how the relation between the
individual and the collective was theorized before Lacan. Durkheim conceptualized
this relation as dual: the individual and the collective are radically separated. Mauss
attempted to unify the field of anthropology through the holistic concept of the total
man. In Lévi-Straus’s formalization the individual becomes a function within a structured,
Symbolic system. Finally, a reading of Lacan’s publications concerning the notion of the
logic of the collective will testify to his attempts at formulating a notion of the subject that
asserts itself against this collective while at the same time retaining its nature of a logical
function. This is the conundrum that Lacan will confront time and again throughout his
teachings. Lévi-Strauss merely provided him with the methodological tools of structural
anthropology that helped him refine the interrogations that he had already begun.
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INTRODUCTION
A popular notion among Lacanian scholars is the occurrence of a radical shift from a Lacan
preoccupied with the Imaginary order to a Lacan focused on the Symbolic. Where the former is
centered around his theory on the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006 [1949]), the latter has come about
through his reading of the anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (Zafiropoulos, 2001; Zafiropulos,
2010 [2003]) and is inaugurated by his presentation entitled The function and field of speech and
language in psychoanalysis in 1953 (Lacan, 2006 [1953b]).
Schrans Lacan on the Assertion of the Subject and the Logic of the Collective
In this paper we reject the notion of a radical shift from the
Imaginary to the Symbolic. What is more, we defend the idea that
Lacan’s evolving conceptual framework can be situated within a
broader intellectual history of anthropological and sociological
thought concerning the relation between the individual and the
collective. Hence, we neither accept a breach within his own
thought, nor with what came before him.
The relation between the individual and the collective
has occupied psychoanalysis since Freud’s writings on group
psychology (Freud, 1955 [1921]) and has been carried on by
psychoanalysts such as Bion and Rickman, both of whom have
influenced Lacan (2001 [1947]). However, it has also been
one of the tenets of sociology and anthropology. The notion
of individuality and the influence of the collective is central
in Durkheim’s work, which ended in an impasse where both
were radically separated. Marcel Mauss attempted to resolve
this impasse with his notion of the total man and Lévi-Strauss
formalized this notion and its implications. In this paper we will
focus on the period between Lacan’s writings on the family, where
this relation is based on identification and heavily influenced by
Durkheim, and his writings on the Symbolic, where it is based on
language and heavily influenced by Mauss and Lévi Strauss.
DURKHEIM AND LACAN ON THE FAMILY
As both Freud (1955 [1921]) and Lacan (2001 [1938]) noted,
the foundations for man’s social life, and thus his relation to the
collective, are laid down in the family. Zafiropoulos (2001) states
that Lacan was influenced by Durkheim in his writings on the
family. We will therefore subject Durkheim’s teachings on the
family to a close reading and compare it with Lacan’s paper on
the family complexes. Finally, we will confront our reading with
Zafiropoulos’ interpretation, which states that Lacan eventually
diverted from Durkheim through a new interpretation of the
notion of the father inspired by Lévi-Strauss.
Durkheim on the Contraction of the Family
Durkheim stated that the family is a social institution subject to a
cultural evolution, with the conjugal family as its final conclusion.
It is not merely a biological affair, but has moral and judicial
implications which are protected by the collective in which the
family is embedded. The evolution of the institution of the family
is determined by what Durkheim (1975 [1892]) calls the law of
contraction: throughout history the number of relatives which
constitute a family has progressively diminished. The historical
starting point of the family is the clan. In this social structure
a totem or alleged forefather is responsible for the creation of
society and forms the center of family life. Members of a clan
were both relatives and fellow citizens (Lamanna, 2002). In these
societies there was no notion of an individual and the different
members of the group were hardly distinguished from one
another. Only when the clan ceased to be nomadic and started
to attach value to the territory on which it lived, did family and
clan become two separate entities. A broad, amorphous family
system became distinguished from a political and territorial clan
organization (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). Families with a patrilineal
or matrilineal structure originated within the clan (Durkheim,
1975 [1892]). A further contraction was realized by the agnatic
families, which were smaller and more egalitarian than the
totem based families. These families were centered around shared
possessions, rather than religion and could be either patrilineal or
matrilineal.
This differs from the Roman, patriarchal families, which
were strictly patrilineal and governed by the principle of patria
potestas. The father represented the group and his authority over
its members and possessions was absolute. This contrasts with
the German paternal family where paternal dominance was less
strict. The son could emancipate himself and leave the family on
his own accord.
The conjugal family is the family structure discerned by
Durkheim in French society of his day. It is a further contraction
of the paternal rather than of the patriarchal family as the
latter was too strict to allow for any further contraction. The
only permanent elements within this system are husband and
wife, although secondary zones of kinship (i.e., relatives up to
the sixth degree), as remnants of the previous structures, still
existed. A child is dependent on its father until it is married. As
Zafiropoulos (2001) correctly points out, with the contraction
of the family the disciplinary rights of the father have greatly
diminished. However, the interference of the state has increased.
In France as of 1889 the father can even be set out of this paternal
rights by the state. According to Durkheim, state intervention
was a necessary prerequisite for the existence of the conjugal
family. Whereas kinship relations in societies constituted by
patriarchal families could only be broken off under the authority
of the father, in the case of those based on the conjugal family the
state must provide its approval in cases of divorce or adoption.
Durkheim warns us however that with the contraction of the
family, individuality and the pursuit of purely individual goals
have increased. When the individual “looks for his purpose
within himself, he falls into a state of moral misery which leads
him to suicide” (Durkheim, 1975 [1892], p. 236). Yet, according
to Lamanna (2002) Durkheim is not necessarily pessimistic
where it concerns the increase of individuality and the decrease
of paternal authority. The former gave rise to individual freedom
and the latter consolidated the ties between the members of
society through state intervention.
Lacan on the Family Complexes
According to Zafiropoulos (2001) Lacan was heavily influenced
by Durkheim’s writings on the family when he wrote his own
contribution on the family complexes (Lacan, 2001 [1938]).
Lacan states that the process of subjective development is
structured by three fundamental complexes which center around
three imagoes: the weaning complex with the imago of the
mother, the complex of intrusion with the imago of the rival
and the Oedipus complex with the imago of the father. The
structuring of these complexes takes place within the family as
a historically determined institution. However, in our modern,
Western families (for which Lacan uses the term “conjugal
families”) the father has become progressively absent due to
the “contraction of the institution of the family” (Lacan, 2001
[1938], p. 27). As a consequence the Oedipus complex inWestern
society has started to falter, which explains the burgeoning
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of modern forms of psychopathology such as the character
neuroses.
The first complex the human infant encounters, the weaning
complex, is “themost primitive complex in psychic development”
and “forms the basis of the most archaic and stable sentiments
uniting the individual and the family” (Lacan, 2001 [1938], p. 30,
trans. Cormac Gallagher). This complex originates from the
separation of the infant from the womb, which, for man, is always
a premature separation. The repercussion of its prematurity is
the universally shared call of the young human for the social
group, and in the first place the family, which is in fact a call for
some sort of social function which meets the needs emanating
from this vital insufficiency of the first years. The first form this
social connection with the outside world takes on is the imago
of the mother as a sublimation of the mother, a bringing into
form and recognizing her as an answer to the vital insufficiency.
It is the first connection to the other the infant makes. It is also
the connection upon which all the consecutive connections with
the other will be made. A successful transition of the weaning
complex is therefore paramount to social development.
As important as the imago of the mother is, it is marked
by a strange ambivalence. The longing for the maternal imago
can become a longing for the state before birth, and as such
instigate the death drive. Because of this ambivalence the lure of
death, of a return to the tranquil, inanimate state of life before
birth, remains present in the ambiguous form of the imago of
the mother. The complex of intrusion offers a solution to these
summons of death through a confrontation with the double,
archetypally represented in the form of the brother. This complex
roused by the first realization of the presence of a sibling, and
of the feelings of jealousy concerning the mother this provokes.
Lacan cautions us that we must not confuse human jealousy
with biological rivalry. For at its most fundamental, jealousy
presupposes mental identification. Lacan considers identification
as primary, the aggressiveness it provokes as secondary. Lacan’s
description of the complex of intrusion is an early form of his
theory on the mirror stage (Lacan, 2006 [1949]). He states that
through the recognition of its own image in themirror the human
infant regains the unity it once experienced in utero.
At the same time the body is experienced as unity, the world,
which was equally perceived as fragmented, is organized by
reflecting the forms of the body. Consequently, Lacan declares
the mirror image to be a good symbol for the reality as it is
experienced at that moment in human development. The world
in this phase is a narcissistic world in which the image of the
double is central and there is no place for others (as truly “other”).
Indeed, the experience of the other as a mirror image does not
help the subject to break through the affective isolation caused by
its prematurity. However, as the formation of the ego through
identification with an external image occurs, the drama of
jealousy and sibling rivalry is being played out. Identificationwith
the unweaned sibling provokes aggressiveness because it triggers
the maternal imago and thus the desire for death. This is why
Lacan states that aggressiveness is secondary to identification:
the identification with the other awakens the primary masochism
(i.e., the death drive) of the weaning complex. However, this
primary masochism can be overcome if it is transformed into
sadism in the form of rivalry. Through identification the infant
can fix one of the poles of primary masochism and turn it
into aggressiveness toward the unweaned sibling. “Thus the
non-violence of the primordial form of suicide engenders the
violence of the imaginary murder of the sibling” (Lacan, 2001
[1938], p. 40, trans. Cormac Gallagher). Consequently the other
is recognized as truly other. This is why Lacan states that jealousy
is the archetype of all social sentiments. However, the complex
of intrusion can also end in an imaginary impasse where the ego
and the alter-ego are not distinguished. This can lead to serious
forms of psychopathology (e.g., paranoia).
Finally, the Oedipus complex installs two fundamental,
psychological instances: repression and the Ego-ideal. Contrary
to Freudian doctrine, which recognizes the father as the primary
agent of castration, Lacan states that the original cause for
repression stems from the lure of death present in the imago
of the mother. The sexual desires of the Oedipus complex re-
activate the desire for the mother and thus the ancient death
drive which is thereupon repressed. The father, as the one who
opposes this desire for the mother, figures only as a secondary
source for repression. As such, repression paves the way for yet
another form of identification with the rival, but this time as an
Ego-ideal: “the ideal of virility in the boy, and in the girl the ideal
of virginity” (Lacan, 2001 [1938], p. 56, trans. Cormac Galagher).
However, Lacan remarks that not every society accords the same
place to the father and its successful development depends largely
on the extent to which both the repressive and the sublimatory
functions are united in the imago of the father. In the Trobriand
of Melanesia, for example, the repressive function is attributed
to the maternal uncle, the sublimatory function to the biological
father. The effect is a relative absence of neurosis and a great
rigidity on the level of cultural productions. In our Western
society “the father [...] is always lacking in some way or another,
whether he be absent or humiliated, divided or a sham” (Lacan,
2001 [1938], p. 61, trans. Cormac Galagher) and the reason for
this Lacan finds in “the same social progress thatmakes the family
evolve toward the conjugal form [and] increasingly submits it to
individual variations” (Lacan, 2001 [1938], p. 74, trans. Cormac
Galagher). When this happens the dialectic of sublimation is
negated and libidinal energy exhausted, which eventually leads
to character neurosis.
Zafiropoulos (2001) states that Lacan’s views betray a
Durkheimian influence because he links the degradation of
the Oedipus complex to the contraction of the family. The
author claims that Lacan is strictly non-Freudian as long as
he is influenced by Durkheim. In Totem and Taboo Freud
(1953 [1912]) stated that human society commenced with the
murder of the primal father. As such, the degraded, dead
father is at the foundation of every human society and not a
historical contingency. Only with the discovery of structural
anthropology through the writings of Lévi-Strauss would Lacan
be able to recognize the structurally lacking father function
and commence his return to Freud. Although we acknowledge
the presence of Durkheimian influences in Lacan’s text from
1938, we find Zafiropoulos’ arguments on his transition from
Durkheimian/non-Freudian to structuralist/Freudian to leave a
lot to be desired. First, although he cites Lévi-Strauss’ work as
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being responsible for this sudden change in Lacan’s thinking
Zafiropoulos never actually demonstrates how this work led to
an interpretation of the father as structurally lacking. When
discussing this change, his main reference is French writer Paul
Claudel and his play Le père humilié. Second, we have seen
that with the contraction of the family there has been a shift
in authority from the father to the state. Even if Durkheim
writes about the degradation of the father, he takes into account
other forms of authority and law. When discussing Durkheim’s
views on the relation between the individual and the collective,
we will see that this shift can be explained by an evolution
in this relation. And last but certainly not least, we have
difficulty accepting that such a slow and arduous process as the
evolution of one’s thinking, Lacan’s in this case, is marked by
sudden revolutions. During an analysis something can befall the
patient and create a new insight—but every analyst knows that
revolutions are very rare in the consulting room. There is always
the process of working through to take into account. Therefore,
it is more interesting to look at the historical development
that links Durkheim to Lacan through Lévi-Strauss, because
the latter wouldn’t have been possible without Durkheim. In
what follows, we will present the reader with the evolution of
the conceptualization of the relation between the subject and
the Other (in sociological terms: between the individual and
the collective) from Durkheim to Lacan. This point of view
will better allow us to link the gradual evolution of Lacan’s
thinking to the developments in sociology and anthropology that
preceded him.
DURKHEIM AND THE OPPOSITION
BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
In The Division of Labor in Society Durkheim (1984 [1893])
describes two forms of relation between the individual and
the collective: mechanical solidarity, a relation based on
similarity, and organic solidarity, a relation based on difference.
Between these two forms he describes an evolution. Primitive
societies are primarily based on mechanical solidarity. The
members of these societies are hardly differentiated. This form
of solidarity is represented in “the totality of beliefs and
sentiments common to the average members of a society”
which then “forms a determinate system with a life of its
own” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 39). This system is the
collective or common consciousness, which cannot be located
within a single physical substratum but is present in its
entirety in every member of society. Nevertheless, it exists
independent from these individuals: “Individuals pass on, but it
abides” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893]). It does not change from one
generation to the other, but links the different generations to
each other. The origin of the collective unconscious lies in the
confrontation of shared feelings and representations. Central to
Durkheim’s theory on the collective consciousness is the notion
of vitality. Consciousness, whether it be individual or collective,
derives its force, its vitality, from strong representations. The
confrontation of shared representations within a society gives
these collective representations a greater vitality, which largely
surpasses the vitality of individual representations. This way of
conceptualizing consciousness has several consequences. First,
Durkheim concludes a split within the human mind between
an individual and a collective consciousness where the latter
appears as “an echo resounding within ourselves of a force
that is alien, one moreover superior to that which we are
ourselves” (Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 56). Second, because
of its greater vitality the collective consciousness appears as a
moral force. It is also the strongest form of authority. When
a certain representation or act goes against these collective
representations, against the moral order and greatest authority,
this provokes a heavy emotional response from the group.
Therefore, Durkheim states that penal law is the most common
expression of the collective consciousness. Last, it also implies
that this authority is not a social function, which receives a
relative importance according to the society in which it occurs,
but represents the society as a whole. For example, in the Roman,
patriarchal families the father did not incarnate a specific social
function but represented the group and its moral ascendancy as
such.
Whereas mechanical solidarity is based on similarity, organic
solidarity is based on difference and specialization. More
specifically, it is based on what Durkheim calls the “division of
labor.” As a society grows larger and more complex the functions
the different members fulfill become more diversified. This in
turn increases the degree of individuality within that society.
This radically changes the relation between the members because
now they all depend upon one another (like the organs that
constitute a body), whereas in societies based on mechanical
solidarity there was virtually no differentiation and everymember
could easily be replaced by any other. According to Durkheim
the standard expression of this form of solidarity is not penal law,
but contractual law. The relation between the members of these
societies are consolidated through contract. However, this does
not mean that such societies are merely based on free exchange
where relations are fleeting and exist only for the duration of
the contract. The state regulates and harmonizes the different
(professional, domestic, etc.) relations between the individuals by
offering a legal framework within which contracts can be made.
Moreover, the state is as dependent on the different members of
society as they are on it and on each other. Society no longer treats
its members as things over which it has rights, but as cooperating
members on which it depends and with regards to whom it
has certain obligations. Thus Durkheim explains the degraded
authority of the father, on which Lacan based his theories on
the Oedipus complex in 1938, through a change in the nature
of the relation between the individual and the collective. In the
patriarchal societies of yore, members were hardly differentiated
and the father represented the group as a superhuman authority.
In modern societies based on the division of labor this authority
shifts to the state as a governing instance which is as dependent
on the individuals as they are on the collective. That is why
Durkheim states that “each time that we find ourselves faced
with a mechanism of government endowed with great authority
we must seek the reason not in the particular situation of those
governing, but in the nature of the societies that they govern”
(Durkheim, 1984 [1893], p. 143–144).
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Even though he discerns an evolution toward individuality,
Durkheim continues to stress the importance of the collective
representations and their effect on the individual. In a paper
written with his nephew, Marcel Mauss (Durkheim and Mauss,
1903), he describes the impact of social morphology (i.e., the
composition and structure of a society) on the classification
systems used by the members of a given society. Whether it is
a primitive classification of plants based on an animistic belief,
or a scientific classification based on genetics, man categorizes
the world that surrounds him in representational systems that
have a certain structure and hierarchy. Durkheim states that
these systems of classification are shaped by a process influenced
by all sorts of external elements, the most fundamental of
which is the social organization of a society. Therefore, many
of the primitive classification systems reflect the morphology
of the society from which they originate. However, once these
representational systems have gained their independence from
the social structures from whence they sprung, they function
according to their own logic.
In conclusion we can state that Durkheim’s collective
consciousness contains its own collective representations, has
its own vitality and functions according to its own laws. What
is more, Durkheim (1924 [1898]) maintains a strict separation
between the collective and the individual. The collective
conscious exists both as an independent entity and resides in
its entirety in every individual, albeit in an unconscious form.
He deduces this from the fact that the collective representations
appear to come from outside the individual and impose
themselves in a coercive manner, under the form of moral
obligations.
Karsenti (1997) states that Durkheim’s conceptualization
brings sociology in an awkward position. He has materialized the
collective (chosification), made it into a collective consciousness
that is unconscious on an individual level. As such, sociology
can only study the social in the light of this irreducible dualism,
where the collective has a certain ascendancy over the individual.
This is due to the fact that for Durkheim a representation
can only exist if it represents something to somebody. In order
to allow for the idea of an unconscious representation he
has to dissociate the notion of representation and individual
consciousness. Subsequently, he postulates the existence of a
collective consciousness that exists alongside the individual
consciousness, because only then the collective representations
can be unconscious for us individuals but not as such. It is
only afterwards that these collective representations appear,
not as the product of some impersonal subject, but as the
effect of their insertion on the level of the limited, individual
consciousness. Thus the notion of representation lead Durkheim
into an impasse where the individual and the collective are strictly
dissociated.
MAUSS AND THE TOTAL MAN
Mauss will furnish sociology with a new object: the total man
(l’homme total). In a shift from sociology to anthropology, which
studies man in all his aspects (social, individual, biological, etc.),
he will rectify Durkheim’s decentering of the individual and
reunite the individual and the collective. The social forms but
a single aspect of this total man. Maus’s is no longer a dualistic
approach, but one that focuses on the complex and dialectical
relation between the individual and the collective in an effort
to expose its underlying rules and structures, rather than its
representations. Mauss defends the notion of a gradual difference
between individual and collective. Individual representations can
permeate the collective and vice versa. Every individual possesses
a fragment of the totality of collective representations, which are
moreover marked by the singularity of the individual.
He finds one of the most convincing examples of these
transitions between collective and individual in the physical and
psychological effects on the individual of the collective suggestion
of death. Mauss (1950 [1926]) describes how in certain primitive
cultures in Australia and New-Zealand individuals die because of
magical or moral causes suggested by collectively shared beliefs.
The individual dies not because of some physical disorder or any
personal conviction or deed, but because of the way in which the
collective manifests itself on an individual level—or, which comes
down to the same inMauss’ view, the way in which the individual
positions itself within the collective. Subjective consciousness and
the will to live pale in comparison to the collective necessity to
die. However, this is not, as it would be in a Durkheimian logic,
because the collective representations act on the individual as
an external cause, but because the individual assumes a given
position within the social structure of the tribe. Hence, this state
often coincides with a breach of community. Through magic or
the committing of a crime the individual breaks off with those
forces which had up until then supported it. For example, the
Wakelbura who eats prohibited game will become sick, consume
himself and eventually die while gasping out the sounds of the
animal in question1.
According to Mauss the destructive effect of this collective
suggestion takes place on the joint between man’s social and
biological nature, albeit minimally mediated by his individual
consciousness. Karsenti (1997) states that this is only possible
if one supposes that the collective resides within the individual,
alongside the individual will to live. Mauss explains this
phenomenon with the assumption that psychological, physical
and social forces coincide in the individual, and rejects the idea
of a strict dissociation between the collective and the individual.
As such, this phenomenon is structured along these three axes:
(1) an individually experienced conviction to die responds to (2)
a collectively shared suggestion to die, upon which (3) a physical
event follows.
Contrary to Durkheim, who took the collective
representations to be the primary object of sociology, Mauss
wants to study the total individual through anthropology. He
defends a return to man in his most concrete form. This is
1Lévi-Strauss (1963 [1949]), in his paper on “The Effectiveness of Symbols,” gives
an interesting pendant of this phenomenon. He explains how a shaman cures a
woman experiencing difficulties during labor by connecting her symptoms with
the collectively shared mythology, which has an effect on these physical symptoms.
This paper has heavily influenced Lacan in his interpretation of the Symbolic Order
(Zafiropulos, 2010 [2003]).
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a psychological and biological individual who appropriates a
fragment of the collective in a process called socialization. Man
is totally individual and totally collective. Moreover, both orders
are subject to the same logic and the same laws. This totality
can equally be found in language. Sociology and anthropology
would benefit from adapting the methods of linguistics, because
they form a science that studies a phenomenon that is both
physiological, psychological and social. Lévi-Strauss will be the
one who takes up the challenge and applies the methods of
linguistics to social structures.
LÉVI-STRAUSS AND THE SYMBOLIC
FUNCTION
For our discussion of Lévi-Strauss’ elaboration of Mauss’
symbolic framework, we will rely heavily of his Introduction to the
work of Marcel Mauss (Lévi-Strauss, 1987 [1950]). In this succinct
analysis of the latter’s body of work, Lévi-Strauss addresses the
question of the subjective implication of the anthropologist in
his observations of other societies, which we consider to be a
specific formulation of the question with regard to the relation
between the individual and the collective. Mauss’ concept of the
total man implies that the anthropologist, as an observer, is of
the same nature as his object of observation. Not only does he
approach this society as an object of study, he also participates as
a subject in this so-called object. Moreover, he has to externalize
his subjective experience in order to present it in a formalized
manner. This task would be impossible if the subjective and the
objective would not meet at a given point.
Lévi-Strauss is prompted to formulate an answer to this
question by an incongruity he perceives in Mauss’ essay on the
gift (Mauss, 2011 [1925]). In this seminal work, Mauss describes
the principles of the exchange of gifts in different cultures. The
study yields several observed principles, which can be found
among very differing cultures across the globe: the obligation
to give, to receive and to reciprocate. Moreover, many cultures
formulate an explanation for these principles in terms of their
own systems of belief. For example, the Maori of New Zealand
refer to the hau. This is a spiritual essence which follows the gift
wherever it goes and has the tendency to return to its origins.
Therefore, if A offers a gift to B, and B passes this gift on to C, then
C has to reciprocate to A for the hau present in the gift needs to
be returned to its original source. However, Lévi-Strauss points
out that we should never take these indigenous explanations
at face value. A concept such as the hau is an element within
a given symbolic system governing the exchange of gifts and
as such should be scrutinized as to its function within this
system.
He compares the hau and similar concepts with algebraic
notions, which represent an undefined value of meaning but
are themselves completely devoid of meaning. Their function
is to reconcile the gap between signifier and signified. They are
an attempt to restore a previously lost unity. As such, they do
not represent an affective value, as Mauss arguments, but have
a logical function and are to be situated on the same level as
the relation they attempt to construct, which is a symbolic level.
Whether something, an object, belongs to one person or the
other is but a derivative of the original, relational character of
the underlying reality. Indeed, according to Lévi-Strauss and
in line with Mauss’ own holistic approach of the total man,
the underlying reality of these obligations and their uniting
principle of the hau is the totality of the exchange. This totality is
reflected in certain linguistic expressions used by some primitive
cultures where giving and receiving, or borrowing and lending,
are designated by one and the same word. As in any form of
communication, the different terms implied (i.e., sender, receiver,
gift, or message) are but secondary elements which divide an
underlying, unified reality.
Lévi-Strauss stresses the relational character of the symbolic.
Through the use of discrete elements it attempts to differentiate
this previously undifferentiated reality. Terms such as subject and
object, individual and collective, I and other, are differentiated
through the use of the symbolic system. This is especially palpable
in the principles present in the exchange of gifts. However, in
such a system there is hardly any place for an individual separate
from the collective. Indeed, Lévi-Strauss stresses the fact that
in Mauss’ study of the notion of the person (Mauss, 1938) the
individual is relegated to a logical function within the symbolic
system—which can only be collective.
LACAN: THE LOGIC OF THE COLLECTIVE
AND THE ASSERTION OF THE SUBJECT
We have already discussed Lacan’s approach of the relation to
the other in terms of identification, which is ubiquitous in his
paper on the family complexes. However, the events of World
War II have brought the dire effects of identification to Lacan’s
attention (Roudinesco, 1997 [1993]). Moreover, a visit to England
in 1947 acquainted him with the approach of Rickman and Bion
in working with groups of mental patients during the war. Their
views of group therapy were based on a conceptualization of the
group in terms of horizontal identification (Bion and Rickman,
1943)2.
In 1953 Lacan wrote a letter to his ex-analyst, Rudolph
Loewenstein, where he claims he has reached a point where
he feels himself “a man more certain of his duties and his
destiny” who has a growing assurance of what he has to say on
“an experience of which only the last few years have permitted
[him] to recognize the nature” (Lacan, 1976 [1953a], p. 132,
our translation). This also marks the year of his Rome Discourse
(Lacan, 2006 [1953b]), a text in which Lévi-Strauss’ influence
can all but be denied. However, in the years preceding it we
see Lacan as a seeker, attempting not only to conceptualize a
relation between the subject and the other that does not merely
rely on identification, but also to formalize this relation in a
logical system. Traces of his quest can be found in his papers
on the logic of the collective (Lacan, 2001 [1945–1946], 2006
[1945]).
In a rare and rather dense paper Lacan (2001 [1945–
1946]) presents us with a mathematical riddle which reveals
the principle of a logical connection between a group and the
2This contrasts with the Freudian point of view, where the vertical identification
with the leader takes precedence over the horizontal identifications between the
members of the group (Freud, 1955 [1921]).
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individuals that constitute it. We are offered 12 visually identical
coins, amongst which one can be discerned on grounds of its
weight. We do not know whether this coin, the “bad coin,” is
lighter or heavier than the others. Its quality does not concern
us, the only thing that concerns us is the notion of its absolute
difference. Furthermore, we have at our disposal a classic pair of
scales. Our task is to discern the “bad coin” with a maximum
of three separate weighings. We lack the space to expound
the complete solution to this riddle (an excellent translation
of Lacan’s article can be found on-line). We will content
ourselves with a brief summary of Lacan’s proceedings and his
conclusions.
After he has illustrated the solution to the problem as it is
presented, Lacan ups the ante by adding another coin to the
collection. Can we still solve the riddle if we have to discern the
“bad coin” among 13 coins? This can indeed be done, provided
that we use another procedure than the one applied to a collection
of 12 pieces. Moreover, this new procedure permits Lacan to
elaborate a formula that allows one to find the “bad piece” among
a maximum amount of coins with the aid of a minimum amount
of weighings. One merely has to follow three simple principles:
first, one has to isolate a piece that is free of any suspicion; next,
one brings about a discord in the distribution of suspicion (e.g.,
the amount of coins that is suspected to be lighter than the others
is greater than the amount that is suspected to be heavier); finally,
one discriminates between the remaining pieces until one has
found the “bad piece.”
Without the complete solution at one’s disposal this will
undoubtedly sound complicated—and it is. However, the
important thing to retain is the fact that this collection cannot
be defined with the aid of any external criterium. There is
no unifying characteristic other than the uniformity of the
collection. The only way we can discern the “bad coin” is through
a comparison with the other coins. Even when, in the first
step, we isolate a coin that serves as a norm with which to
compare the other coins, this is done through a comparison
with the coins already present. In other words, the absolute
difference that constitutes the individual in this collective can
only be reached through a comparison with the others. Moreover,
this relation between the individual and the collective can be
formalized through a logical formula. As such, Lacan can sustain
the notion of a separation between the individual and the
collective (which was too radical in Durkheim’s case) while at the
same time formalizing this relation as a logical function (which
was Lévi-Strauss’ aim). In a paper that chronologically precedes
this one, but which logically forms its consequence, Lacan
(2006 [1945]) formulates how the subject asserts itself against
the collective.
Lacan presents us with yet another riddle. Three prisoners
are summoned by the warden who promises to grant one his
freedom if he successfully stands a test. He presents them with
five disks: three white and two black. Each prisoner will have a
disc attached to his back such that he himself cannot see the color
of his own disc, but can perfectly observe the disks the other two
are wearing.Moreover, they are not allowed to communicate. The
purpose of the test is to infer what color disc one is wearing based
on logical reason. Thereupon, the warden distributes the white
disks among the prisoners. After staring at each other for some
time, all three prisoners head for the warden. What happened3.
In the ideal solution one prisoner, A, starts from the
hypothesis that he is black. Within this condition another
prisoner, B, could make the same hypothesis and easily come to
the conclusion. If he were indeed black, the third prisoner, C,
would see two black disks and leave at once. However, C does
not move at once. Therefore, B can conclude that he is not black
and leave. Yet, B does not leave either. Thus, A can only conclude
that his initial hypothesis (“I am black”) was false. And because
in reality all three prisoners followed the same path of reasoning,
they all leave once they have reached this conclusion.
Lacan is hard pressed to point out the sophistic nature of this
solution. For if they all leave at the same time, they all must doubt
their initial conclusion which was based on the fact that the others
remained standing still. Therefore, after they have all left, their
doubts will make them all pause. This scenario is reminiscent of
Achilles and the tortoise, and one can wonder whether they will
ever reach the warden. Lacan arguments that they will, and that
they only need two stops to come to an absolute, logical certainty.
For the first halt objectifies B’s conclusion: if C had seen two
black disks, he would never pause. The second stop objectifies A’s
conclusion: if B pauses a second time, that means the first pause
was not conclusive for him (which it would have been had A been
black). Thus, Lacan concludes, these temporal hesitations are a
necessity in order to arrive at a logically sound argument.
The introduction of time in order to arrive at a logical
conclusion does not agree with the spatial nature of classical logic,
which is based on the universality of certain forms. One does
not need time: either one sees the solution or one does not see
it. However, Lacan states that in this logic of the collective three
logical times can be discerned. The first is what he call the instant
of the glance. The riddle would be limited to this time if two black
disks were distributed, its solution summarized in the following
statement: “Being opposite two blacks, one knows that one is
white,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 167). The subject of this statement
is the impersonal “one” of every logical statement. This is also the
subject present in Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity: the “one”
that represents the collective consciousness and is expressed
through penal law. Indeed, according to Durkheim the latter
does not imply that “I do not perform a certain act because it
is punishable,” but rather that “it is punishable, because one does
not perform such acts.” However, this subject is also present in
the reasoning of Mauss and Lévi-Strauss as it can be compared to
notions such as the hau. It merely serves a logical function within
a closed, symbolic system. Yet Lacan has something different in
mind, namely a subject that asserts itself against the collective. In
order to arrive at this assertion, the subject has to encounter the
other.
Indeed, the situation where one prisoner sees two black disks
does not present itself. Therefore, a second time is inaugurated
with the following (intuitive) statement: “Were I a black, the
two whites that I see would waste no time realizing that they
are whites,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 168). In this time, one
3We will only scratch the surface of this text. For a thorough discussion of the
riddle, its solution and implications, see Hoens (in press).
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prisoner (A in our example) makes himself the object of the
gaze of the other two and puts himself in their position. In this
case, time is necessary for the other two to reach a conclusion
because it is based on the fact that the other stands still (which
is interpreted as a hesitation). Lacan calls this the time for
comprehending. The subject of this time is a subject determined
by the reciprocity of the other. The relation between these subject
is of an imaginary nature, meaning that the prisoners mirror each
other (Aucremane, 1985).
The time for comprehending also puts every subject under
a logical pressure. Indeed, how long does this comprehending
take? If A hesitates to come to a conclusion and the other two
precede him, he will never ever be able to reach any sound
conclusion because it can only be based on their standing still.
Therefore, a necessary moment of concluding interrupts the time
for comprehending through the following statement: “I hasten
to declare myself a white, so that these whites, whom I consider
in this way, do not precede me in recognizing themselves for
what they are,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 168). This statement is
the subjective assertion. The time for comprehending leads to a
conclusion, but only if the subject anticipates the certainty of his
conclusion and seizes it in a moment of urgency.
Lacan operates a shift from spatiality to temporality, from
a subject seized by an intersubjective logic to a subject that
asserts itself in an act based on a judgment that lacks sufficient
logical ground. This subject is the personal subject, the one that
pronounces “I” (in French: “je”). It can only exist on the condition
that it has assumed the other forms of subjectivity (i.e., the
impersonal “one” and the reciprocal subject). The assertion of
this subject is different from the subject as a mere function of the
symbolic system—and yet, Lacan states that this subject also has
a logical form and stems from a logical process.
According to Lacan the temporal logic of this riddle can be
applied to group of undefined size, given that there is always one
black disc less than there are prisoners. As in the case with the
13 coins, the group is not constituted by a common trait. The
trait is retroactively defined by the group through the assertion
of the subject. The collective is founded on the reciprocity of
the difference. As such, the collective logic can be expressed
according to the following principles: “(1) A man knows what
is not a man; (2) Men recognize themselves among themselves as
men; (3) I declare myself to be a man for fear of being convinced
by men that I am not a man,” (Lacan, 2006 [1945], p. 174). Thus
Lacan formalizes the relation between the individual and the
collective. In this formalization the individual is a subject and
as such a function within a logical process. However, through
the anticipation of its truth it can assert itself against this
collective and escape the reciprocal relation in which it was
captured.
CONCLUSION
Lacan’s views on the relation between the subject and the other
gradually change between 1938 and 1953. Initially this relation is
conceived of as strictly based on the principle of identification.
Such was the case in his paper on the family complexes, where
the process of socialization is described as a series of consecutive
identifications. From 1953 onward Lacan conceptualizes the
Other no longer as an image with which to identify, but as a
symbolic system governed by the laws of language. This new
conceptualization is realized through the tools handed to him
by Lévi-Strauss’ structural anthropology. In this paper we have
demonstrated that between 1938 and 1953 Lacan attempted to
formulate the individual as a function, the subject, within a logic
of the collective. Thus, although Lévi-Strauss handed him the
methodology, this encounter does not constitute a radical breach
in Lacan’s work—it is merely a refining of the work he had already
started.
Moreover, we have demonstrated that Lacan’s statements on
the logic of the collective can be situated within a broader
frame of reference. Whereas Durkheim ended in a situation
where individual and collective are radically separated, Mauss
and Lévi-Strauss relegated the individual to a mere logical
function within a collective, symbolic system. Lacan on the other
hand conceptualized a subject that can assert itself against the
other while still remaining part of a logical system. This is the
conundrum that Lacan will confront time and again throughout
his teachings and needs to be taken into account when one wishes
to study the further influence of Lévi-Strauss on Lacan. The
subject, a logical function within the Symbolic, speaks and asserts
itself.
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